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ABSTRACT 
Not all terrorist organizations are rootless groups engaging only in international 
terrorism. Many terrorist groups are socially intertwined with the local population, highly 
territorialized and directly compete for governance. Terrorist groups such as the IRA, 
Hamas, Mahdi Army, Sendero Luminoso and Hezbollah are past and present examples of 
a socially intertwined terrorist organization. These groups present significant, but 
different challenges to our national security than Al Qaeda does and a different strategy 
to defeat them may be in order. Using Hezbollah as an example, this thesis addresses the 
question of whether the direct military approach used to combat terrorist groups, such as 
Al Qaeda, is appropriate to defeat a socially intertwined terrorist group as well. If not, 
what techniques would be the most useful? 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Not all terrorist organizations are rootless groups engaging only in international 
terrorism. Many terrorist groups are socially intertwined with the local population, highly 
territorialized and directly compete for governance. Terrorist groups such as the IRA, 
Hamas, Mahdi Army, Sendero Luminoso and Hezbollah are past and present examples of 
a socially intertwined terrorist organization. These groups present significant, but 
different challenges to our national security than Al Qaeda does and a different strategy 
to defeat them may be in order. Using Hezbollah as an example, this thesis addresses the 
question of whether the direct military approach used to combat terrorist groups, such as 
Al Qaeda, is appropriate to defeat a socially intertwined terrorist group as well. If not, 
what techniques would be the most useful? 
To effectively explore the hypothesis, this thesis looks to understand Hezbollah as 
a whole. It examines the history and background of the organization, as well as its 
support structures and global footprint. While uncovering the breadth of Hezbollah’s 
global network, it is clear that the organization receives support in many different forms, 
from many different areas of the world. One of the main reasons for Hezbollah’s 
extensive support structure appears to be its perceived legitimacy through many parts of 
the world. Perceived legitimacy is a key component to Hezbollah’s success and is the 
critical difference when comparing it to Al Qaeda. While Hezbollah clearly operates a 
deadly international terrorist organization, it also runs hospitals, provides public services 
and participates in the local government of Lebanon. By linking itself to legitimate 
actions on behalf of Shia Muslims in Lebanon, Hezbollah improves its support base in 
terms of both ideology and finance.  
After providing a background on Hezbollah, this thesis takes a look at possible 
solutions to defeat Hezbollah. Using Game Theory as a tool to evaluate possible 
outcomes and reactions, two strategic options to defeat Hezbollah are considered. In the 
game, direct military action and indirect means are used against Hezbollah, while 
Hezbollah chooses between legitimate nation building and terrorist acts. The results of 
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the game indicate that it is in the best interest of the allies to use more indirect means 
instead of the preferred use of direct military action that appears more effective against 
groups like Al Qaeda.    
To provide a basis for answering the root question of this thesis- what techniques 
are the most useful to defeat a socially intertwined terrorist group- it explores the use of 
targeted killing and how it may or may not work against a group such as Hezbollah. As a 
result of the discussion, it appears that targeted killing increases the support for 
Hezbollah and may be inappropriate in most cases. The final section of this thesis 
explores key measures to successfully defeat a socially intertwined terrorist group. The 
most promising measures appear to be tied to attacking the organizations legitimacy, not 







II. UNDERSTANDING THE NETWORK 
A. HEZBOLLAH: A BRIEF HISTORY AND WHY DO WE CARE 
Any serious discussion about threats to the national security of the United States 
must consider all terrorist organizations of global reach. In President George W. Bush’s 
address to the nation on September 20, 2001, he stated that the war on terrorism “will not 
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”1 
While most of the world’s attention and subsequent strategy discussions have been 
focused on Al Qaeda and its many affiliated forms, one terrorist organization of global 
reach that deserves special emphasis and an inherently different strategy is Hezbollah. 
CIA director George Tenet testified in 2003: "Hezbollah, as an organization with 
capability and worldwide presence, is [al Qaeda's] equal, if not a far more capable 
organization. I actually think they're a notch above in many respects."2 Deputy Secretary 
of State Richard Armitage echoed that opinion by stating, "Hezbollah may be the A team 
of terrorists," while "al Qaeda is actually the B team."3 Armitage followed those words 
with a statement that most Americans may have forgotten, “they [Hezbollah] have a 
blood debt to us and ... we're not going to forget it."4 To be specific, Hezbollah was 
responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization before the 
9/11 attacks. While Hezbollah is a serious threat to the United States and its interests, it  
                                                 
1 President George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation,” U.S. Congress, September 20, 2001, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed January 10, 2008). 
2 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National 
Security of the United States, February 12, 2003. 
3 Al Bawaba,  “US Deputy Secretary of State: Hizbullah – ‘A Team of terrorism,’” 
http://www.albawaba.com/en/main/155019/&searchWords=armitage (accessed January 10, 2008). 
4 Ibid. 
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also enjoys support and legitimacy both locally and globally.5 This perceived legitimacy 
and subsequent support differentiates Hezbollah from groups such as Al Qaeda and may 
necessitate a non-direct approach to undermine that legitimacy.  
In order to defeat Hezbollah, we must understand the organization, their history, 
alliances and their goals.  A quick look at the organization will help us understand what 
the organization is all about and how to ultimately change their behavior or defeat them 
altogether.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Hezbollah was founded in 1982 during the Lebanese civil war. The Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) took advantage of the chaos from the civil war and used 
southern Lebanon as a staging ground for attacks on Israel. Israel quickly invaded 
southern Lebanon to defeat the PLO and eliminate its safe haven. In response to Israel’s 
occupation of southern Lebanon, a militia of Shia followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
which were backed and trained by Iran, came together to form Hezbollah.  Their initial 
goals were to install an Islamic government and drive Israel out of southern Lebanon.6  
Over time, Hezbollah quickly proved its lethality in multiple terrorist attacks 
against the United States and other Western powers. Hezbollah is responsible for the 
1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing in which 241 American servicemen were killed 
and sixty Americans were injured and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon in 
1983 and 1984. In 1985, three members of Hezbollah hijacked TWA flight 847 and killed 
a Navy diver onboard. Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah conducted multiple kidnappings 
of westerners, including Terry Anderson, William Buckley and Richard Higgins. In these 
cases the captive was either killed or held for ransom.  
                                                 
5 John Kifner, “Hezbollah Leads Work to Rebuild, Gaining Stature,” The New York Times, August 16, 
2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/world/middleeast/16hezbollah.html?ex=1313380800&en=c016b6007
fee4b3a&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed January 10, 2008). 
6 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
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As Hezbollah’s local influence rose in the late 1980s, Hezbollah sought to export 
their successful terror network across the globe. In 1989, Spanish authorities arrested ten 
members of Hezbollah as they attempted to smuggle 18 pounds of plastic explosives into 
Velencia, Spain. The Hezbollah operatives were thought to be planning to attack U.S. and 
other western targets within Western Europe.7 During that same year, a bombing of 
Union des Transports Aériens flight 772 in West Africa killed 171 people. French 
intelligence authorities believed “cells of pro-Iranian Shiite extremists played "a 
prominent role" in the bombing.”8 In 1992 and 1994, Hezbollah conducted operations in 
South America with the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and a community center in 
Argentina. In June 1996, fourteen Hezbollah operatives were indicted for the bombing of 
a U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, the Khobar Towers, killing 19 U.S. 
servicemen and wounding 370.9 For the last eight years, Hezbollah has been a sponsor of 
suicide bombings of civilian targets throughout Israel. For example, according to Daniel 
Byman, “Hezbollah has provided guerrilla training, bomb-building expertise, 
propaganda, and tactical tips to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other anti-Israeli 
groups. There are also reports that Hezbollah is trying to establish its own Palestinian 
proxy, the Return Brigades.”10  During its 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah was accused 
of war crimes against civilians. Human Rights Watch declared:  
Hezbollah forces in Lebanon fired thousands of rockets into Israel, 
causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian structures. Hezbollah’s 
means of attack relied on unguided weapons that had no capacity to hit 
military targets with any precision. It repeatedly bombarded cities, towns, 
and villages without any apparent effort to distinguish between civilians  
                                                 
7 Robin Wright, “Hezbollah Seen Setting Up Terror Network in Africa,” The Los Angeles Times, 
November 27, 1989, A1, 
http://libproxy-.nps-.edu/login-?url=http://proquest-.umi-.com/pqdweb-?did=2026612-&sid=6-&Fmt=2-&c
lientId=11969-&RQT=309-&VName=PQD (accessed January 10, 2008). 
8 Ibid.  
9 For a detailed account and chronicle of Hezbollah and Hezbollah linked attacks, see: Robin Wright, 
Sacred Rage : The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Touchstone Publishing, 2001). 
10 Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be next?” Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2003), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101faessay82606-p0/daniel-byman/should-hezbollah-be-next.html 
(accessed January 10, 2008). 
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and military objectives. In doing so, Hezbollah, as a party to an armed 
conflict governed by international humanitarian law, violated fundamental 
prohibitions against deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against 
civilians.11 
In addition to this fairly infamous history, some ties between Hezbollah and Al 
Qaeda have been detected including plans and payments between Hezbollah and the Al 
Qaeda operative Abu Musa'ab Al-Zarqawi (AMZ). According to the U.S. Treasury 
Department, Hezbollah paid AMZ $35,000 to train and facilitate the transfer of terrorists 
from other nations into Lebanon for final missions inside Israel.12 The threat that 
Hezbollah poses to the United States and the world is captured by Hassan Nasrallah’s 
statement on al-Manar television in 2002, “Death to America will remain our 
reverberating and powerful slogan: Death to America.”13 
C. GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF THE HEZBOLLAH 
NETWORK 
In an attempt to better understand the scope and depth of the Hezbollah network, 
it can be useful to visualize the data. Using open source news and literature as 
background, Table 1 is an attempt to list known or suspected Hezbollah terrorist attacks 
and support structures. Those data points were then geospatially located, as closely as the 
source data would allow, and approximate geo-coordinates for the events were assigned. 
Figures 1-5 graphically depict the information in Table 1.  
Figure 1 depicts the global Hezbollah network in terms of operations, finance and 
support. The visual depiction of the network clearly shows the impressive global scale of  
                                                 
11 Human Rights Watch, “Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 
War,” August 2007, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/iopt0807/2.htm (accessed January 10, 2008). 
12 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaida Terrorists,” JS-757, September 
24, 2003, http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js757.htm (accessed January 10, 2008).  
13The White House “In Their Own Words: What the Terrorists Believe, What They Hope to 
Accomplish, and How They Intend to Accomplish It,” September 2006,   
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-7.html (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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Hezbollah’s operations. Any misperceptions that Hezbollah is a local Lebanese problem 
are quickly replaced by the real facts that Hezbollah has network systems or conducts 
operations in almost every part of the world.  
Figure 2 depicts the Middle East portion of Hezbollah’s network. While most of 
Hezbollah’s state sponsorship comes from the Middle East, Hezbollah has also been 
involved in significant attacks or failed attacks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the 
United Arab Emirates. By visualizing this data, it may be easier to devise better strategies 
to build alliances and cut off support for Hezbollah’s network. The map is also useful in 
depicting how much of a destabilizing influence Hezbollah is to the region.  
Figure 3 depicts the South American Hezbollah network. This map serves as a 
reminder of how close a large portion of Hezbollah’s network is to the United States. The 
crime, money laundering and individual donations from the small area of the Tri-Border 
region of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina directly funds a significant portion of 
Hezbollah. This funding may also be used to support high profile local attacks such as the 
Argentine bombings and highlight the risk Hezbollah poses to the Western Hemisphere.  
Figure 4 depicts the West African Hezbollah network. While it is primarily 
financial in nature, it is very important to Hezbollah’s overall operating budget. With the 
advent of the new AFRICOM geographic military command within the United States, it 
is clear that the battle for regional influence is important for all nations. By visualizing 
how much regional support Hezbollah holds over West Africa, it should be apparent how 
much emphasis the United States should put into the region to de-legitimize Hezbollah’s 
network in the eyes of those supporters.  
Figure 5 depicts a portion of Hezbollah’s Lebanese network and specifically 
attempts to capture the scope and sheer number of attacks that have taken place within 
Beirut itself. This map does not cover the myriad of attacks committed against Israel, but 
it does serve as an indication of just how much internal disruption Hezbollah causes to 
Lebanon.  
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12/3/1984 lebanon beirut 6.0 Peter kilburn 1.0 0.0 kidnapping assasination usa 35.483790 33.900004
12/3/1984 kuwait kuwait city 7.0 Kuwait Airlines flight 221 2.0 0.0 hijacking murder usa 55.130599 24.991295
1/1/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Jean‐Paul Kaufmann 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.490747 33.871006
1/1/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Lawrence Martin Janco 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.493969 33.891830
3/1/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Marcel Carton 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.491001 33.868493
3/1/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Marcel Fontaine 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.488349 33.866633
3/16/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Terry Anderson 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.498121 33.876592
4/23/1985 lebanon beirut 6.0 Alec Collet 1.0 0.0 kidnapping assasination british 35.495921 33.884233
5/22/1985 lebanon beirut 6.0 Michel Seurat 1.0 0.0 kidnapping assasination french 35.485293 33.870785
5/25/1985 kuwait kuwait city 2.0 emir of kuwait 3.0 0.0 bombing kuwait 47.982400 29.372100
5/28/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 David Jacobsen 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.482370 33.898173
6/9/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Thomas Sutherland 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.482066 33.898955
6/14/1985 greece Athens 7.0 TWA flight 847 1.0 0.0 hijacking murder usa 22.027783 37.611080
9/26/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Hazel Moss 0.0 0.0 kidnapping british 35.499711 33.884277
9/26/1985 lebanon beirut 1.0 Amanda McGrath 0.0 0.0 kidnapping british 35.483060 33.900260
3/8/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 George Hansen 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.488511 33.873968
3/8/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 Aurel Cornea 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.486902 33.873958
3/8/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 Philippe Rocheau 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.490846 33.873459
4/9/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 John McCarthy 0.0 0.0 kidnapping british 35.492310 33.887560
4/11/1986 lebanon bekaa valley 1.0 Michel Brillant 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.505554 33.852024
4/11/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 brian keenan 0.0 0.0 kidnapping irish 35.484524 33.899792
4/17/1986 lebanon beirut 6.0 John Douglas 1.0 0.0 kidnapping assasination british 35.483255 33.898253
4/17/1986 lebanon beirut 6.0 Philip Padfield 1.0 0.0 kidnapping assasination british 35.481691 33.899604
9/9/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 Frank Reed 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.482670 33.901200
9/12/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 Joseph Cicippio 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.481740 33.887856
9/26/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 Jean‐Marc Sroussi 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.488519 33.872079
9/26/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 David Hirst 0.0 0.0 kidnapping british 35.497527 33.881721
10/21/1986 lebanon beirut 1.0 Edward Tracy 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.496681 33.892008
1/1/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Roger Auque 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.493362 33.872318
1/20/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Terry Waite 0.0 0.0 kidnapping british 35.498215 33.878941
1/24/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Robert Polhill 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.484618 33.898892
1/24/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Alann Steen 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.483953 33.899167
1/24/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Jesse Turner 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.489848 33.894967
1/24/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Mithileshwar Singh 0.0 0.0 kidnapping indian 35.535763 33.847320
6/18/1987 lebanon beirut 1.0 Charles Glass 0.0 0.0 kidnapping usa 35.487384 33.893857
2/17/1988 lebanon beirut 6.0 Lt. Colonel William R. Higgins 1.0 0.0 kidnapping assasination usa 35.505967 33.828280
4/5/1988 thailand bangkok 7.0 kuwait airways flight 422 2.0 0.0 hijacking murder kuwait 98.556353 16.729245
1/1/1989 spain valencia 11.0 explosives intercepted 0.0 0.0 attempted bombing 0 ‐0.376806 39.470200
9/19/1989 congo brazzaville 8.0 UTA flight 772 170.0 0.0 bombing 0 15.283333 ‐4.266667
9/24/1989 lebanon beirut 1.0 Jack Mann 0.0 0.0 kidnapping british 35.499434 33.888362
8/8/1991 lebanon beirut 1.0 Jerome Leyraud 0.0 0.0 kidnapping french 35.485999 33.872208
1/1/1992 argentina buenos aires 2.0 Israeli Embassy 30.0 0.0 bombing 0 ‐58.461184 ‐34.973999
3/17/1994 thailand bangkok 11.0 plot uncovered 0.0 0.0 attempted bombing thailand 100.493889 13.752222
7/18/1994 argentina buenos aires 2.0 Jewish Community Center 85.0 0.0 bombing 0 ‐58.604939 ‐34.118619
7/19/1994 panama colon 8.0 alas chiricanas flight 110375 21.0 0.0 plane bombing panama ‐79.900000 9.333333
7/26/1994 england london 2.0 Israeli Embassy london 0.0 20.0 bombing england ‐0.189056 51.505000
7/27/1994 england london 2.0 jewish charity building 0.0 6.0 bombing england ‐0.189000 51.605000
6/25/1996 saudi arabia khobar 2.0 khobar towers 20.0 372.0 bombing usa 50.209500 26.253400
1/1/2002 usa north carolina 9.0 operation smoke screen 0.0 0.0 crime usa ‐80.845259 35.230688
1/1/2002 usa michigan 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐83.045089 42.330571
1/1/2002 canada vancouver 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐123.131376 49.259174
1/1/2002 canada montreal 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐73.638267 45.544688
1/1/2002 canada ottawa 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐75.697065 45.420436
1/1/2002 canada toronto 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐79.388805 43.669491
7/12/2006 israel nahariyya 5.0 israel 0.0 0.0 missile_rocket israel 35.106820 33.036115
7/14/2006 israel haifa 5.0 israel 0.0 0.0 missile_rocket israel 34.998699 32.814755
12/11/2006 UAE abu dhabi 11.0 plot uncovered 0.0 0.0 attempted bombing 0 54.616667 22.783333
1/1/2008 iran tehran 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 51.435800 35.706100
1/1/2008 paraguay ciudad del este 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐54.668886 ‐25.500163
1/1/2008 brazil foz de iguazu 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐54.523021 ‐25.546656
1/1/2008 argentina puerto iguazu 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐54.475427 ‐25.737573
1/1/2008 senegal 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐17.379663 14.703224
1/1/2008 mali 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐8.023723 12.601317
1/1/2008 sierra leone 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐13.280469 8.433227
1/1/2008 liberia 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐10.780173 6.238033
1/1/2008 cote d'ivory 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐4.052235 5.269650
1/1/2008 ghana 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 ‐0.184919 5.564356
1/1/2008 togo 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 1.280767 6.168771
1/1/2008 benin 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 2.600604 6.403942
1/1/2008 nigeria 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 3.515179 6.478687
1/1/2008 cameroon 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 9.737268 3.898137
1/1/2008 congo 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 11.900000 ‐4.766667
1/1/2008 angola 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 13.238323 ‐8.928262
1/1/2008 syria damascus 10.0 funding 0.0 0.0 finance 0 38.562054 35.543006
1/1/2008 paraguay ciudad del este 9.0 crime 0.0 0.0 crime 0 ‐54.668886 ‐25.500163
1/1/2008 brazil foz de iguazu 9.0 crime 0.0 0.0 crime 0 ‐54.523021 ‐25.546656
1/1/2008 argentina puerto iguazu 9.0 crime 0.0 0.0 crime 0 ‐54.475427 ‐25.737573
 
Table 1.   Known or Suspected Hezbollah Terrorist Attacks and Support Structures 
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Figure 1.   Hezbollah’s Global Network 
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Figure 2.   Hezbollah’s Middle East Network 
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Figure 3.   Hezbollah’s South American Network 
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Figure 4.   Hezbollah’s West African Network 
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Figure 5.   Hezbollah’s Lebanese Network
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D. FINANCIAL OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION 
1. Organizational and Financial Highlights 
One of the many techniques being employed to defeat terrorist networks is the 
targeting of financial support for terrorists. The theory is that if all financial and material 
support for a network can be disrupted, the network will shut down through an inability 
to operate. Hezbollah understands this concept very well and to ensure its continued 
existence, it has become one of the most diversified and well funded of all terrorist 
networks in the world. Hezbollah currently receives funding from state sponsorship, 
individual remittances, crime networks, and drug profits. Why does Hezbollah need such 
a vast network of funding and what do they use the money for? 
Hezbollah’s current goals include the eradication of Western colonization from 
Lebanon, the destruction of the State of Israel, and the establishment of Islamic 
governments in the Middle East. The organization has morphed from a simple militia to a 
full-fledged semi-state with a political wing, social welfare organization, military 
organization and a modern media outlet. This transformation is the result of an influx of 
hundreds of millions of dollars per year and Hezbollah is now a direct competitor to the 
established Lebanese government in many areas of Lebanon. In a classic example of the 
problems created by ungoverned areas or weak nation-states, Hezbollah initiated the 2006 
war with Israel from inside Lebanese borders. After the massive Israeli retaliation, 
National Public Radio reported, “Hezbollah has promised to provide housing and 
furniture for the next year to each of the tens of thousands of families whose homes were 
destroyed by the month-long Israeli bombing campaign. Hezbollah spokesmen say the 
funding will come from foreign donors, including Iran, and it will be disbursed directly, 
not through the Lebanese government.”14 The ability to filter and distribute international 
funding within Lebanese borders causes a significant challenge to the authority of the 
Lebanese government. The fact that Hezbollah actually holds 14 seats in the Lebanese 
                                                 
14 National Public Radio, “Hezbollah Takes the Lead in Rebuilding Lebanon,” August 17, 2006, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=5662485 (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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Parliament makes this relationship even more bizarre, but it provides Hezbollah with 
significant international legitimacy. To further Hezbollah’s influence in the region, it 
funds and operates 50 hospitals throughout Lebanon. One hospital, the Al Janoub hospital 
receives $100,000 per month from Hezbollah.15 While these social welfare programs are 
obviously expensive, they provide Hezbollah with support from the local population and 
act as a showpiece for propaganda messages distributed through their media machine. In 
early 1991, Iran donated one million dollars to Hezbollah to start al-Manar TV. This 
television channel has become the voice of Hezbollah and now operates on an estimated 
budget of $15-50 million a year and reaches approximately 200 million people across the 
world.16 The complexity of Hezbollah’s organization has enabled the military wing to 
flourish. The Washington Post called Hezbollah “the best guerrilla force in the world.”17 
The military wing of Hezbollah operates on as much as $300 million per year and possess 
modern unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and ultra modern anti-ship 
missiles.18 Hezbollah’s military wing is first rate by any standard and uses a significant 
portion of its budget to stockpile all types of missiles and rockets for use in its never 
ending war against Israel. Hezbollah used approximately $50 million to establish military 
training camps for multiple terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, in the Baka’a 
valley.19 Hezbollah continues to operate the camps to this day.  
Hezbollah is clearly a well diversified and funded organization, but the United 
States can interrupt much of Hezbollah’s funding by analyzing the streams of revenue 
and using both direct and indirect methods to cut off the sources of those streams.  
                                                 
15 Scott Wilson, “Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah,” The Washington Post, December 20, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12336-2004Dec19.html (accessed January 10, 2008). 
16 Mutliple sources including, Steven Stalinsky, “Terrorist TV:Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV Should be 
shut down,” National Review, April 04, 2006, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/stalinsky200604040821.asp (accessed January 10, 2008). 
17 Edward Cody and Molly Moore, “The Best Guerrilla Force in the World,” The Washington Post, 
August 14, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300719.html (accessed January 10, 2008). 
18 Ibid.  
19 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, 61, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm  (accessed January 10, 2008). 
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2. State Sponsorship 
Hezbollah receives state funding in arms, training and money from both Syria and 
Iran. As mentioned previously, the largest monetary contributions are from Iran. Most 
large expenditures, including the founding of training camps in the Baka’a valley and the 
start up of al-Manar TV, come from Iranian seed money.  In some situations, Iran may 
have a vested interest in increased activity or instability. During these periods, Iran has 
been noted to make lump sum payments of as much as $22 million to disrupt peace talks 
or foment instability within Israel and Palestine20.  Hezbollah would then source out the 
money to groups for action. According to Palestinian officials, they had “intercepted e-
mail communications and bank transactions indicating that Hezbollah has increased its 
payments to terrorists. ‘Now they are willing to pay $100,000 for a whole operation, 
whereas in the past they paid $20,000, then raised it to $50,000.’21  
In addition to monetary support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah also receives 
significant arms shipments and training on new weapon systems from both countries. 
These shipments include thousands of short-range rocket systems and ballistic missiles. 
Syria built and transferred the 220mm rockets used in the deadly attack on Haifa in 
2006.22 Syria also supplies RPG-29s, Kornet-E, Sagger2 and Metis-M anti tank missiles 
for Hezbollah to use in volley fire against Israel’s top of the line main battle tank, the 
Merkava III. Hezbollah was able to disable several of these key Israeli vehicles as a result 
of this important state support; without it, Hezbollah would be at a serious 
disadvantage.23 Hezbollah also received a very sophisticated C-802 anti-ship cruise 
                                                 
20 Mathew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God,” The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, February 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=772 (accessed June 
9, 2008).  
21 U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, “Iran: A Quarter Century of State Sponsored 
Terror,” February 16, 2005 p. 14, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/98810.PDF 
(accessed June 9, 2008).  
22 The Israel Project. “An Inside Look at Hezbollah’s Iranian and Syrian Sponsored Arsenal,”  
http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/c.hsJPK0PIJpH/b.2904001/k.ED3B/An_Inside_Look_at_Hezbollahs_I
ranian_and_SyrianSponsored_Arsenal.htm (accessed June 9, 2008).  
23 Edward Cody and Molly Moore, “The Best Guerrilla Force in the World,” The Washington Post, 
August 14, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300719.html (accessed June 9, 2008).  
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missile along with an Iranian training team. This system is an Iranian version of the 
Chinese Silkworm missile and with assistance from Iran, Hezbollah successfully attacked 
an Israeli warship.24 Hezbollah also took delivery of up to twelve unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV) and began to fly them over Israel in late 2004.25  While Syria does not 
offer the monetary support that Iran does, it provides a transfer point for all Iranian arms 
shipments into the country and facilitates the logistical and technological support for the 
organization.  
Countering state sponsorship will require a consensus of nations to stop Iran and 
Syria from meddling in the affairs of Lebanon and to halt their proxy war against Israel. 
One of the largest obstacles to accomplish this is the designation of Hezbollah as an 
international terrorist organization. Currently only four nations consider Hezbollah a 
terrorist organization and two other nations consider only the military wing terrorists.26 
Because Hezbollah has been successful at creating a large umbrella organization, it 
screens their movement in unsavory affairs and allows the group to have many 
supporters. As long as most of the international community does not designate Hezbollah 
as a terrorist organization, it will be hard to stop Iran and Syria from supporting it. The 
United States must understand the incentives necessary to build a consensus against 
Hezbollah’s actions. We must cut deals with Europe to put pressure on Iran and Syria to 
isolate them from economic aid. In Iran’s case, we should withhold western engineering 
support for their depleting oil fields. More effort must be put on intercepting arms 
shipments and any dollar denominated deals with either country. The United States must 
move to support the Lebanese government and fill the ungoverned southern areas with a 
strong Lebanese or international rule of law and government. Hezbollah flourishes in 
southern Lebanon because it provides crucial services to the people. If the United States 
                                                 
24 Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker, “Arming of Hezbollah Reveals U.S. and Israeli Blind Spots,” 
The New York Times, July 19 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/world/middleeast/19missile.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slog
in (accessed June 9, 2008).  
25 Jim Kouri, “Hezbollah's UAVs concern Israel and United States security experts,” Renew America, 
September 5, 2006, http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/kouri/060905(accessed June 9, 2008).  
26 Canada, Israel, United States and the Netherlands list the entire organization as a terrorist entity, 
while the United Kingdom and Australia list only the military wing as terrorist.  
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can support the Lebanese government to provide these same services, Hezbollah’s 
benefits will be diminished and their cost to the people will be amplified. It will be 
difficult, but the approach has the possibility to work where other more direct techniques 
have failed.  
While all these efforts will require significant funding and political capital, State 
sponsorship of Hezbollah is the single issue that makes it one of the most powerful 
terrorist groups in the world. Therefore, the cost should not deter our resolve to tackle the 
problem.  
3. Individual Support 
Each one of Hezbollah’s funding streams has its benefits and its constraints. For 
example, while state sponsorship is Hezbollah’s largest single source of funding at an 
estimated $200 million,27 Hezbollah leaves itself accountable to the wishes of the donor 
state. If a state sponsor, in this case Iran, does not agree with Hezbollah’s tactics, the state 
may withhold sponsorship or, on the flip side, the state sponsor may instruct Hezbollah to 
operate in a manner that does not suit Hezbollah’s internal goals. State sponsorship is 
therefore the least desirable funding source and Hezbollah has diversified to reduce these 
constraints.  
a. Individual Remittances 
Since the time of the Phoenicians, Lebanese society has been one of 
movement and migration. Years of civil war and fighting between Hezbollah and Israel 
has led to a further wave of migration to North and South America, Africa, other Gulf 
States and Europe. Some estimates claim as much as 80% of Lebanese people live 
                                                 
27 These estimates are from western diplomats and political analysts in Beruit as of 2004. Global 
security and Anthony Cordesman believe they are exaggerated and put the number lower, in the $25-$50 
million range. Original article: Scott Wilson, “Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah,” The Washington 
Post, December 20, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12336-2004Dec19.html 
(accessed June 9, 2008).  
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outside Lebanon.28 As these large groups of Lebanese citizens settle across the world, 
many of them send money home to support their families or other organizations such as 
Hezbollah within Lebanon. According to Nassib Ghobril, the head of research and 
analysis for a large bank in Beirut, “these migrants supply Lebanon with about $1,400 per 
capita every year,” one of the highest rates of remittances in the world.29 Getting a piece 
of this large inflow of money is very important to Hezbollah. Al-Manar TV and other 
propaganda efforts are key tools used by Hezbollah to spread its message and entice 
people to donate money to the cause. In a case from North Carolina, Lebanese migrants 
were using Hezbollah produced videos to gather support from the local Arab community 
to donate money to Hezbollah. The group would meet every week for “prayer meetings,” 
watch al-Manar produced videos, read letters from Hezbollah leaders and solicit 
donations of support to send back to Hezbollah in Lebanon.30  
Similar individual solicitation is conducted in the Tri-Border area in South 
America. This area is the shared border of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina and is the 
home of a very large Lebanese and Arab population. In one case, the National Police of 
Paraguay seized multiple cards and envelopes that were used to solicit money on behalf 
of the families of martyrs and prisoners in Lebanon. The technique of raising money in 
this way was so successful, that the criminals under investigation had documented more 
than $700,000 in currency transfers. 31  This case mirrors the Charlotte, North Carolina 
                                                 
28 Impressions Staff, “Lebanese Dispora,” Impressions, 2007, http://impressions-
ba.com/features.php?id_feature=10280 (accessed January 5, 2008).  
29 Robert F. Worth, “Home on Holiday, the Lebanese Say, What Turmoil?” The New York Times, 
December 24, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/world/middleeast/24lebanon.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed June 
9, 2008).  
30 Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Funding The Party of God” Journal of International Security Affairs, Winter 
2004, 46, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2004/06/No_6_Winter_2004_Full_Issue.pdf (accessed June 
9, 2008).  
31 Francesc Relea, “'Commandos' terrorists take refuge in the triple border: Dozens of Arabs buy false 





2Ben%2Bla%2Btriple%2Bfrontera%2522%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dsafari%26rls%3Den (accessed June 
9, 2008).  
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example. They both employ solicitation of Lebanese expatriates by a Hezbollah linked 
patron, in this case Ali Khalil Mehri, by using propaganda tapes and videos produced by 
al-Manar TV. This technique of soliciting expatriates is also used in West Africa. Two 
public cases indicate the massive scope of West African support for Hezbollah: an 
intercept of $1.7 million dollars in donations from Senegal and the unfortunate crash of 
an airliner carrying over $2 million in donations bound for Beirut. These two incidents, in 
1998 and 2003 respectively, support claims by Israeli intelligence that Hezbollah raises 
several hundred thousand dollars every year from this part of the country.32  According to 
Arab news articles uncovered by Hezbollah expert Matthew Levitt, the crash of UTA 
flight 141 killed a "foreign relations official of the African branch of the Lebanese 
Hezbollah party and two of his aides,”33 as well as destroying the $2 million in cash. The 
Lebanese communities in West Africa control much of the successful business and 
commerce in the area and provide a critical support node for Hezbollah’s operations. It is 
estimated that as many as 300,000 Lebanese immigrants live across West Africa and they 
are viewed as the wealthiest social group in the area because of their domination of the 
import-export businesses along the coast.34 Maintaining this support was so important to 
Hezbollah that they sent envoys to the region to console the survivors and the families of 
victims while doing as much damage control as possible.35  
While much of the individual support for Hezbollah is donated directly to 
the organization through couriers or liaisons, a large portion of the support is funneled 
through charitable organizations. Charities pose a difficult problem to agencies that are 
                                                 
32 Matthew Levitt, “Hizbullah's African Activities Remain Undisrupted,” Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy. March 2004., http://washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?CID=463&template=C06 
(accessed June 9, 2008).    
33 Ibid. 








y%29%29%29%29 (accessed June 9, 2008).    
35 Miriam Karouny, “Benin Plane Crash Deaths Rise to 111,” Reuters, 26 December 2003. 
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involved in cutting off Hezbollah financing. Illicit financing is difficult to detect and easy 
to legitimize. There are hundreds of charities sending money into the region and much of 
the money goes to legitimate arms of Hezbollah. For example, organizations such as the 
Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching could legitimately funnel money into local 
schools, which then preach Jihad against the West and recruit for Hezbollah.36 According 
to the principal of one of eight schools that receive money from the Institution, “we have 
the same aims and goals as Hezbollah.”37 The ability to intertwine social, political and 
military causes and still leave the ability to deny unsavory activities, gives Hezbollah a 
uniquely effective ability to raise money and support. Many people donate money 
unknowingly to charities such as the Goodwill Charitable Organization or the Lebanese 
Welfare Committee with no idea that the donation will either be used directly or 
indirectly to fund terrorism. Another difficult problem for authorities is the possibility of 
incorrectly shutting down a legitimate charity. If an organization can show the good 
deeds produced by their charity dollars and disassociate itself with terror, it is often very 
hard to prove a case against an illicit organization. Even if authorities can prove the case 
and shut down a charity, the organization may simply move its staff and structure to 
another area and start over with a new name.  
While countering individual remittances is very difficult, several actions 
may be effective at slowing the donations.  Using the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s political 
wing against itself may lead to a slowdown in terror. Since Europe and several other key 
areas consider the political and social wings of Hezbollah legitimate organizations, we 
should require Hezbollah to provide detailed accountability of all funds entering the 
organization and indicate how those funds are dispersed to maintain that legitimate status.  
The United States should also raise the regulatory requirements for detailing exactly how 
money is transferred, and provide specific accounts and names of recipients, as well as 
ensuring complete accounting of the end use of the funds. The U.S. should also increase 
the criminal penalties for working in a charity that supports terror and require registration 
                                                 
36 William Samii, “Iran: Teheran Supports Hezbollah In Lebanon,” Radio Free Europe, November 10, 
1999, http://www.rferl.org/features/1999/11/f.ru.991110134517.asp (accessed June 9, 2008).  
37 Ibid.  
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and background checks for all employees of charities that move money outside the 
United States. We should also require more detailed and thorough accounting on wire 
transfers and movement of funds outside the United States. These last few 
recommendations will require new database management and filter tools to be developed, 
more infrastructure and manpower, and may slow down the legitimate transfer of funds.  
4. Crime Networks 
One of the most extensive and profitable sources of funding for Hezbollah is their 
global crime network. Most estimates put Hezbollah’s yearly crime profits in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars. In fact, according to two sources, General James T. Hill, 
commander of the U.S. Southern Command and Paraguayan interior minister Julio Cesar 
Fanego, Hezbollah generates as much as five hundred million dollars a year from crime 
and drug activity from just one area of South America.38 While this sum seems almost 
absurdly high, multiple researchers and government agencies have documented the wide-
spread crime and drug activity in the area and the extensive links in the region to 
Hezbollah.  
The Tri-Border area of South America is the border between three cities: Ciudad 
del Este (Paraguay), Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), and Foz de Iguazu (Brazil).  According 
to a Library of Congress research report, Ciudad del Este, the largest city in the Tri-
Border Area, was generating “$12 to $13 billion in cash transactions annually, making it 
the third city worldwide behind Hong Kong and Miami.”39 This large flow of dollars is 
linked to massive money laundering from drug proceeds and crime profits, which then 
make their way back to Hezbollah accounts in Lebanon. Initial Hezbollah links in the 
area were detected during investigations into a well known businessman in the area, Ali 
Khalil Mehri. In February 2000, Paraguayan police raided his home for allegedly selling 
millions of dollars worth of pirated software and funneling the proceeds back to 
                                                 
38 “U.S. General: Islamic Rebels Get Cash from Latin America Gangs,” Orlando Sentinel, March 10, 
2003, A9. 
39 Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America,” The Library of Congress, July 2003, 3, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf (accessed January 9, 2008). 
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Hezbollah. During the raid, police uncovered Hezbollah propaganda videos, fund-raising 
forms for terrorist organizations and records of money transfers to known Hezbollah 
locations worth $700,000.40 As investigators uncovered more of the Hezbollah 
organization in the Tri-Border area, Assad Ahmad Barakat emerged as the clear leader of 
Hezbollah’s financial network in the area. According to Carlos Cálcena, Asuncion's 
public prosecutor for drug trafficking and terrorism, “Barakat's remittances to Hezbollah 
are believed to have totaled up to $50 million dollars since 1995.”41 According to the 
U.S. Treasury, Barakat is the deputy of Hezbollah financial director, Ali Kazan, and the 
primary liaison in the Tri-Border Area for Hezbollah's Secretary General Shaykh Hasan 
Nasrallah.42 In addition to these claims, several personal letters from Nasrallah were 
seized by investigators, which specifically thanked Barakat and his Tri-Border network 
for his financial contributions.43 The investigation and later collaborations between the 
United States and the Tri-Border nations have yielded much success against Hezbollah 
and Barakat resulting in many of his subordinates now being imprisoned. However, 
Barakat’s network was so large and profitable that Hezbollah will likely try to leverage 
its contacts in the area to continue to raise funds there.  
In late 2004, the Unites States formalized its collaborative efforts with the Tri-
Border nations and entered the 3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security. This type of 
effort must continue and be used in other parts of the world to shut down ungoverned 
areas and empower local governments. This indirect approach allows the U.S. to achieve 
its aims without alienating foreign nations and seems to have had significant success in 
the Tri-Border Area. According to the 2006 Country Report on Terrorism, the 3+1 Group 
appears to have aided significantly in the reduction of Hezbollah’s presence in the area.  
The largest challenges in the area are the bolstering of Paraguay’s legal system and the 
                                                 
40 Blanca Madani, “Hezbollah's Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier,” January 2002,  
http://www.meib.org/articles/0201_l2.htm (accessed on January 9, 2008). 
41 Ibid. 
42 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting 
Hizballah in Tri-Border Area,” June 10, 2004, http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js1720.htm (accessed 
on January 9, 2008). 
43 Marc Perelman, “U.S. Hand Seen in Paraguay’s Pursuit of Terrorism Suspect,” The Jewish Daily 
Forward, January 17, 2003, http://www.forward.com/articles/9127/ (accessed on January 9, 2008). 
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enforcement of immigration and customs laws.44  Both of these areas can be improved 
with U.S. financial support and training programs.  
While South America has clearly been a hot spot for illicit financing, Hezbollah’s 
networks have also made it into North America as well. Operation “Smoke Screen” 
unveiled an elaborate crime network linking a Hezbollah cell in North Carolina to 
operatives in Canada and back to Lebanon.45 Thirty suspects were linked to the cell and 
charged with providing “currency, financial services, training, false documentation and 
identification, communications equipment, explosives and other physical assets to 
Hezbollah.”46 The group used a cigarette smuggling scheme to exploit the tax difference 
between cigarettes sold in North Carolina and Michigan. Over a year and a half period, 
the Hezbollah cell was able to generate an estimated $7.9 million dollars by taking 
advantage of the 70 cent tax difference per pack of cigarettes and driving them across 
state lines.47 In addition to direct financial contributions to Hezbollah, the group used 
proceeds from its criminal activity to purchase night vision and global positioning 
devices, mine detection equipment, laser range finders and other high technology 
equipment not readily available to Hezbollah in Lebanon.48  These purchases were made 
through an elaborate network throughout the U.S. and Canada, which ultimately ended 
with direct conversations between the U.S. cell and the Hezbollah military commander in 
Beruit, Sheik Abbas Harake.49 The ability of Hezbollah to operate within the United 
States with direct guidance from Lebanon is a serious concern for domestic security, 
especially given the espoused anti-American goals listed earlier in this paper. Luckily, 25 
of the 30 Hezbollah cell members were convicted while five others are still at large. This 
particular case is not an anomaly; several other unrelated Hezbollah arrests have occurred 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, Chapter 2. 
45 BBC News, “Hezbollah Suspects Arrested,” July 22, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/845803.stm (accessed on January 9, 2008). 
46 United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud et al., case no. 00-CR-147, March 28, 2001.  
47 Rachel Ehrenfeld,  Funding Evil (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2005), 138. 
48 Matthew Levitt, “Banning Hibzallah Activity in Canada,” January 6, 2003, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1576 (accessed on January 9, 2008). 
49 Rachel Ehrenfeld,  Funding Evil (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2005), 138. Also referenced in multiple 
other citations including 43 above.  
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in the United States in which operatives were either attempting to purchase thermal 
imaging gear or shipping weapons and ammunition to Lebanon.50  
Success against Hezbollah’s crime network will take significant interagency 
efforts and the ability of multiple organizations to share information and work together. 
Continuous legislative pressure will be needed to push law enforcement, intelligence and 
other government agencies to work together against a common enemy. Without such 
efforts our ability to successfully prosecute the cell members and dismantle the networks 
will be seriously degraded.   
                                                 
50 Matthew Levitt, “Banning Hibzallah Activity in Canada,” January 6, 2003, 
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III. LOOKING AT SOLUTIONS 
A. USING GAME THEORY TO LOOK AT WINNING STRATEGIES 
AGAINST HEZBOLLAH 
A socially embedded terrorist group such as Hezbollah has multiple options to 
attain its given goals and objectives. They have the option to use terrorist acts to incite 
fear and coerce populations and governments while they also have the ability to use 
social programs, aid and other legitimate nation building activities to gain support. By 
fully exploring Hezbollah’s stated goals and options to achieve those goals, it may be 
possible to adapt our strategy to defeat them. 
Game Theory is an interesting tool that highlights the strategic options of both 
Hezbollah and the United States. It aids in the evaluation of strategic moves by the 
players to ensure the highest payoff for each party and can also evaluate the usefulness of 
threats or promises in gaining the best outcome for either party.  
To set up a game matrix and analyze possible moves, several assumptions are 
needed to begin. The first step is determining what specific moves the players have at 
their disposal. Then a payoff matrix is built to determine how beneficial an outcome 
would be to the players. Once the moves and payoffs are determined, the game begins 
with each player making a move and counter move to achieve the highest payoff. The 
game will end with a specific payoff to each player. It is then possible to look at the 
results and determine if different moves, threats or a promise would increase a player’s 
payoff. In some cases, a losing player may be able to alter his strategy and lower the 
payoff of the winner by so much, that the winner is forced to negotiate a revised strategy 
that will greatly benefit the loser. During these negotiations, a technique known as Nash 
Arbitration assists both sides in determining the fairest possible outcome for a given 
negotiation start point.  
 28
1. Strategic Moves 
In this specific game, the two strategic moves available to the United States are 
also the major techniques used to defeat terrorist organizations: direct and indirect action. 
Direct action implies targeted killings, bombings, raids and other uses of force up to full-
scale war. Indirect action implies political alliances, building bonds with the people, 
subverting ideologies, eliminating ungoverned areas, increasing the legitimacy of the 
local government over Hezbollah and so on. The two strategic moves available to 
Hezbollah are the two major tools they use to gain power and influence in the area: 
terrorist acts and legitimate nation building. Hezbollah uses terrorist acts to strike against 
its enemies; induce fear and panic amongst civilian populations; coerce nations to alter 
their policies and to provoke heavy handed responses from enemy nations.  Hezbollah 
uses legitimate nation building techniques to support the people it claims to represent; to 
give itself legitimacy in world opinion; to actively replace the local government and to 
raise support from the local population for its activities. 
2. Assumptions 
Several assumptions must be made to support the strategic moves and payoffs for 
each player:  
a. Allies include the United States and Israel. 
b. Allied tolerance for collateral damage is low. 
c. Direct Action is more measurable and faster to show progress to civilian 
constituents if they demand action.  
d. Indirect Action is less measurable and slower to show progress to civilian 
constituents if they demand action.  
e. Public pressure for the Allies to defeat Hezbollah is higher following a 
terrorist attack and lower in times of peace. 
f. Hezbollah’s goal of regional dominance is more important than anything 
else51. 
                                                 
51 In accordance with Hezbollah’s stated goal of instituting an Islamic government in Lebanon and 
expelling all outside influence and those that cooperate with them.  
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g. Perfect information is available in which the players clearly understand the 
payoffs of the other player. 
h. Rational actors are playing the game.  
i. All option values, 1-4, are scaled to indicate that 4 is the best, while also 
being twice as good as 2 and four times as good as 1. 
3. The Game 
This game theory model is set up to analyze the following question: Is the direct 
or indirect approach more effective in the quest to defeat the Hezbollah Network?    
a. Allied Options 

















4 Best Option: Hezbollah stops terrorist acts and no direct action is necessary 
(Indirect action works to destabilize the Hezbollah’s legitimacy with no 
collateral damage) 
 
3 Next Best Option: Hezbollah stops terrorist acts as a result of direct action 
(Direct action destroys Hezbollah’s ability to conduct terrorist acts but 
some collateral damage is committed) 
 
2 Next Option: Hezbollah continues terrorist acts after direct action is used 
(Allied public acknowledges that the government is doing something, 
but it causes collateral damage and Hezbollah maintains its ability to 
conduct terrorist acts) 
 
1 Worst Option: Hezbollah continues terrorist acts while Allies use an indirect 
approach 
(Allies appear to do nothing about the problem because Indirect action 
takes time to work, while Hezbollah continues to conduct terrorist 
attacks) 
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b. Hezbollah options 
To measure the options available to Hezbollah, a scale of 1-4 is used to 
measure the relative value of the option. In this scale, 4 is the highest and 1 is the lowest. 














Table 3.   Values of Specific Options for Hezbollah 
 
 
c. Allies vs. Hezbollah 
Based on the assumptions and values listed in the previous sections a 






4 Best Option: Hezbollah uses legitimate action while allies use direct military 
action 
(Hezbollah’s legitimacy increases and they gain world and local support 
against allied  aggression) 
 
3 Next Best Option: Hezbollah uses terrorist acts, which provoke allied direct 
action 
(Hezbollah creates fear among opponents and seem powerful while 
appearing in a legitimate struggle against allied direct action) 
 
2 Next Option: Hezbollah uses legitimate action to gain support while allies use 
indirect approaches to undermine it 
(Hezbollah loses its ability to strike fear in its opponents and must use its 
resources against the allied resources to win over popular support) 
 
1 Worst Option: Hezbollah continues terrorist acts while allies use an indirect 
approach 
(Hezbollah loses its legitimacy and support against the non aggressive 











Figure 6.   Game Matrix of Allies vs. Hezbollah 
Figure 6 shows each player with their respective moves and corresponding 
payoffs from that move. The allied payoff is the first of the two numbers in a given cell 
and Hezbollah’s payoff is the second. The arrows correspond to the direction each player 
would like to move to attain a higher payoff.   
As a result of this initial game, a Nash equilibrium52 is identified where 
the allies use indirect action and Hezbollah uses legitimate action. This choice results in a 
payoff of (4,2) and can be seen in the Payoff Matrix in Figure 7 below.  
                                                 
52 A Nash equilibrium is the point at which neither player can improve unilaterally given the other 
players strategy.  
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Figure 7.   Payoff Matrix 
 
Since a Nash equilibrium exists at (4,2), that point is both the likely 
outcome of the game and neither player can improve unilaterally from its strategy 
associated with that outcome. The outcome of this game is certainly not to the advantage 
of Hezbollah and it appears that the Allies will gain their best outcome by using the 
indirect approach.  It appears as though Hezbollah may improve their outcome if they can 
incite the allies to use direct action against them and move up the line toward (3,4).  The 
next step of the game is to explore the options available to see if Hezbollah can improve 
their outcome.  
d. First Moves 
Does moving first change the outcome of the game and can either player 






























derive the following assessment of first moves shown below in Figure 8. Each possible 
first move is analyzed with the corresponding opponent move and the given payoff for 









Figure 8.   Assessment of First Moves 
 
In this case, the Allies definitely want to move first to ensure their 
maximum payoff, because if Hezbollah is allowed to move first it will choose to conduct 
a terrorist action and improve its payoff.  
e. Threats 
The next strategic move available to Hezbollah is the Threat. Can 
Hezbollah improve its payoff by threatening a specific action? By looking at our original 
payoff values again, we analyze Hezbollah’s threat option in Figure 9 below to see if they 






Allies first moves:  
If Direct Action then Legitimate Action yields a payoff of (3,4) 
 If Indirect Action then Legitimate Action yields a payoff of (4,2) 
So, moving first for the Allies allows them to achieve at least the Nash Eq payoff 
of (4,2) 
 
Hezbollah first moves: 
 If Terrorist Action then Direct Action yields a payoff of (2,3) 
  If Legitimate Action then Indirect Action yields a payoff of (4,2) 





















Figure 9.   Hezbollah’s Threat Option 
f. Promises 
The final strategic move available to Hezbollah is the promise. Is it 
possible to offer the allies a promise that will improve its outcome? For a legitimate 
promise to exist, the promise must hurt Hezbollah and help the Allies.  
 
Threats 
Allies already achieve their maximum outcome, so there is no need to threaten 
 
Hezbollah always attains a higher payoff if the Allies conduct Direct Action, so 
they will use a threat to remove the possibility that Indirect action and legitimate 
action will occur: 
  
If the Allies choose Indirect Action then Hezbollah threatens to use 
Terrorist Action which yields a payoff of (1,1) 
 Normally Allied Indirect Action leads to Hezbollah Legitimate Action and 
a payoff of (4,2) 
 
Since threatening to conduct Terrorist Action if the allies use Indirect action hurts 
both players it is a viable threat and removes the (4,2) payoff as a possiblity.  
 
Does the threat work alone? To find this out, we must eliminate the outcome (4,2) 
and reanalyze the game.  
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1,1  -- 
The Allies will be forced to conduct Direct action to improve their payoff as a 












Figure 10.   Promises 
g. Summary of Strategic Moves 
After looking at the game, the Allies already achieve their highest 
outcome with no further action needed. Hezbollah, on the other hand, would like to 
improve their position. As a result of strategic moves, Hezbollah can improve their 
payoff by moving first and also by communicating a threat. In each case Hezbollah 
increases their payoff from 2 to 3 and 4 respectively. Hezbollah should use the threat 
option to secure its maximum outcome.  
Now that Hezbollah understands that it can improve its position, it has 
some pretty significant leverage to negotiate with the allies and asks the United Nations 
to act as an arbiter between it and the Allies. Using Nash Arbitration it will be possible to 
renegotiate the game.  
Promises 
Allies already achieve their maximum outcome so there is no need to promise 
 
Hezbollah wants Allied Direct Action to improve its payoff: 
 
 If Allies choose Direct Action then Hezbollah chooses Terrorist Action 
which yields a payoff of (2,3) 
 Normally Allied Direct Action leads Hezbollah to choose Legitimate 
Action which yields a payoff of (3,4) 
 
This Promise hurts both Hezbollah and the Allies, so it is not a promise. This 
option also does not make sense from a real world perspective. Would a rational 
actor make a promise to induce the other player to conduct Direct Action against 
yourself?   
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h. Security Positions 
To determine the security positions53 of each player, we must look at each 
player separately and maximize the outcome of that player while the opponent will 
attempt to minimize the other player’s outcome. The result is the security position for that 
player.  
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Figure 11.   Security Position for Allies 
Figure 11 above indicates that the security position for the allies is 2. Now 
we must look at the security position for Hezbollah.  
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Figure 12.   Security Position for Hezbollah 
                                                 
53 The position from which each player feels comfortable beginning the negotiations. Any payoff less 
than the security position is unacceptable to that player. 
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Figure 12 above indicates that 2 is the security position for Hezbollah. As 
a result of these two zero sum games, we have determined a new point called the status 
quo point to determine where we will be at if negotiations fail. In this case, the status quo 
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Figure 13.   Payoff Matrix 
The line intersecting (3,4) and (4,3) is the pareto optimal line54 from 
which the negotiation set is derived. The Nash Arbitration point will come from this set. 
As a result of Hezbollah’s credible threat to conduct Terrorist actions, the Allies will be 
forced into arbitration and the resulting Nash arbitration yields a point of (3,4).  
 
                                                 
54 The pareto optimal line is a line that takes all slack out of the solution, so that no one player can 
improve without the other player being worse off.  
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Figure 14.   Payoff Matrix 
In this particular game, Hezbollah may also start the negotiations from the 
threat point of (1,1) because of their credible threat to use terrorist acts. However, the 
result of Nash arbitration from the threat point of (1,1) still ends in the same solution as 
starting at the status quo point, so it will not be covered for the sake of brevity.  
4. Summary 
The debate over direct and indirect methods of engagement against terrorist 
organizations is divisive as both techniques have many pros and cons. As a result of this 
game and its stated list of assumptions, it appears that Hezbollah will not allow the Allies 
to use a completely indirect strategy because Hezbollah understands that an indirect 
strategy will slowly degrade their power and influence in the area. Since Hezbollah 
understands this important issue, they will either use or threaten to use, terrorist actions to 
push the Allies into using direct action. Unfortunately, this result indicates the highest 























always helps them achieve a higher payoff. This is interesting when you compare the 
game result to real world increase in popularity of Nasrallah and Hezbollah following 
Israel’s full-scale war against Hezbollah in 2006.55  
Even though this game is a fairly simplistic mathematical look at a complex 
problem, the game identifies the difficulty presented when trying to defeat this type of 
network. If Hezbollah knows they will be beaten with the indirect and most effective 
strategy, they have the tools necessary to incite direct action and in turn gather more 
support for itself. Dealing with this type of socially imbedded terrorist organization is a 
very difficult problem that may never be solved, but simply dealt with at the lowest cost. 
Looking at how this game turned out, it appears that a solution to minimize the threat of 
Hezbollah lies somewhere in between using direct action and indirect methods and a look 
at both options is warranted.  
B. A LOOK AT TARGETED KILLINGS AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A 
SOLUTION 
Military and political leaders continue to debate the best strategy to defeat 
Hezbollah. The main options appear to be whether direct military action and targeted 
killing is better than an indirect strategy of diplomatic pressure and strengthening the 
local government. Spreading democracy and eliminating zones of competing governance 
in Lebanon are the ideas of the day, while targeted killing is much more controversial. To 
accomplish a targeted killing, “a nation's intelligence, security, or military forces identify 
the individual in question and carry out an operation intended to kill him or her.”56 A  
                                                 
55 Dan Murphy, “In war's dust, a new Arab 'lion' emerges Hizbullah's Nasrallah is hailed as a regional 
hero,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 29, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0829/p01s02-
wome.html (accessed January 9, 2008).          
56 Eben Kaplan, “Targeted Killings,” New York Times, January 25, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_012506.html?_r=1&oref=slogin  (accessed December 11, 
2007).  
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senior Israeli officer was recently interviewed on the best technique for dealing with the 
current leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, he said, "there's only one solution 
for him… This man must die."57  
The solution implied by the Israeli officer provides a nation with a measurable 
sense of progress against the terrorist organization. The targeted killing may also 
eliminate an inspirational and operational leader from the organization. This leadership 
gap, it is hoped, may also lead to an overall decline in the terrorist organization as it did 
after the arrest or killing of the leaders of Aum Shinrikyo, Sendero Luminoso, and Action 
Directe. At a minimum, it is hoped that the targeted killing will significantly disrupt a 
terrorist organization such as it did to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which was hobbled58 
after its leader, Fathi Shqaqi, was assassinated in Malta in 1995. There are many pros and 
cons to targeted killing, but it can be a very effective tool to eliminate individuals that are 
viewed as a threat to our national security and should be considered as an option in the 
overall strategy to defeat Hezbollah. However, targeted killing has serious ramifications 
if it is used inappropriately. Therefore, it is important to understand the background, legal 
issues, and overall utility of the technique before rushing to use it.  
1. Background and Legal Issues 
The United Nations Charter states, “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations.”59 This statement is an important consensus of world 
opinion that sets up the legal differentiation between assassination and targeted killing. 
An enemy combatant, whether part of an organized military or a civilian who undertakes 
military activities, is a legitimate target at all times and may be lawfully killed, even if by 
surprise. Because of this legal loophole, targeted killing sprung to life as a strategic 
                                                 
57 Steven Erlanger, “Israel is committed to blocking arms and killing Nasrallah” International Herald 
Tribune, August 20, 2006,  http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/20/africa/web.0820israel.php (accessed 
December 11, 2007).  
58 After the killing, the group took approximately six years before it started serious suicide bombings 
again.  
59 United Nations Charter: Article 51.   
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option. Since the late 1990s, the Clinton administration’s  “executive branch lawyers 
have held that the president's inherent authority to use lethal force -- under Article 2, 
Section 2 of the Constitution -- permits an order to kill an individual enemy of the United 
States in self-defense.”60 The Bush administration has continued the trend and “has 
concluded that executive orders banning assassination do not prevent the president from 
lawfully singling out a terrorist for death by covert action.”61 As the United States moved 
to a state of war, the legal justification has been met to conduct targeted killings. This 
justification led some lawmakers, including Rep. Robert L. Barr Jr. (R-Ga), to began 
legislation to remove the ban on assassination because they felt that the prohibition of 
assassination “limited the swift, sure and precise action needed by the United States to 
protect our national security.”62 Over a 30 year period, the consensus of the nation, its 
lawmakers and its presidents transitioned from condemnation of assassination, to arguing 
legal definitions, to finally moving to lift the ban altogether.  
The significant interest in lifting the ban on assassination has increased as a 
means to enforce the rule of law when all conventional means fail. Targeted killing can 
be an effective solution if apprehension is impossible or a legal system does not support 
prosecution. For example, once a target has been identified, Israel will attempt to arrest or 
detain the individual, but if those targeted cannot or “will not be apprehended by the 
Palestinian Authority, Lebanese government or the Israeli armed forces, the policy (of 
targeted killing) is the only way to mete out justice to perpetrators of violence.”63 Israel 
then applies a set of rules to determine whether targeted killing is legal: “that arrest is 
impossible; that targets are combatants; that senior cabinet members approve each attack; 
that civilian casualties are minimized; that operations are limited to areas not under 
                                                 
60 Barton Gellman, “CIA Weighs ‘Targeted Killing’ Missions,” The Washington Post, October 28, 
2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A63203-2001Oct27?language=printer (accessed 
December 11, 2007).  
61 Ibid. 
62 Catherine Lotrionte, “Then to Target Leaders,” The Washington Quarterly, summer, 2006, 75.  
63 Steven R. David, “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Ethics & International Affairs, Issue 17, 
2003, 111.  
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Israeli control; and that targets are identified as a future threat. Unlike prison sentences, 
targeted killing cannot be meted out as punishment for past behavior.”64 
2. Successful Examples  
Most arguments for or against targeted killings refer to Israeli examples and try to 
determine whether they were effective or not. The Israelis have used targeted killing for 
years with success and failure. In many cases of both success and failure, the targets were 
Hezbollah’s leaders.65 In one three year study, Israel conducted 75 targeted killings and 
was able to kill the targeted individuals in 65 of those attacks for an 86% success rate.66 
This success rate has huge effects on the terrorist organizations and their ability to replace 
leaders, equipment, and money, plus it also affects terrorist morale.  In one stretch of 
targeted killings, Israel was able to kill several Hamas leaders in succession. It was so 
successful, that Hamas declined to announce who their next leader would be.  
Another successful example is the targeted killing of Abu Musab Zarqawi (AMZ). 
His death eliminated a huge symbol of the Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) network and 
destroyed the largest propaganda weapon their network had. While AQIZ still exists and 
is still a threat to the security in Iraq, its worldwide message of defiance to the West was 
seriously degraded with the killing of AMZ. Messages, videos and calls for Jihad have all 
but stopped since AMZ’s death.  There was a short spurt of activity from AQIZ 
immediately after AMZ’s death, but it appeared to be a reaction to convince the world 
that it was still in operation. In reality, it appears that they executed all the operations that 
had been planned previous to AMZ’s death and a large lull in activity followed during the 
vacuum of leadership. This same phenomenon occurred in Israel as well. It appears the 
attacks will increase in frequency after a targeted killing of a leader, but the lethality and 
effectiveness goes down. According to Daniel Byman, “the lethality rate (in terrorist 
                                                 
64 Laura Blumenfeld, “In Israel, a Divisive Struggle Over Targeted Killing,” The Washington Post,  
August 27, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/26/AR2006082600917_3.html?sid=ST2007112401542 (accessed December 
11, 2007).  
65 The failures will be covered in the next subchapter  
66 Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz and Shaul Misal, “What happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Issue 28, 2005,  227.  
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suicide bombings) rose from 3.9 deaths per attack in 2001 to 5.4 in 2002, its highest 
point. Then, in 2003 the rate began to fall, dropping to 0.98 deaths per attack that year, 
0.33 in 2004, and 0.11 in 2005.”67 While many variables may have contributed to these 
results, this trend follows the increase in attacks after other targeted killings and is one 
measure of how the lack of leadership lowers the effectiveness of a terrorist attack.  
Targeted killings degrade the supply of a scarce resource, good terrorist 
leadership. In some very centralized networks the death or capture of its leader can 
destroy the whole network as seen in 1992 with the capture of Abimael Guzman and the 
fall of the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso. It affects the morale of terrorists, 
disrupts the planning and execution of future attacks and deters quality people from 
leading terrorist organization. The killings also provide a sense of justice to a nation that 
may have no other recourse for implementing the rule of law.  
3. Failures and Subsequent Issues 
While there are clearly many positive aspects of targeted killings there are also 
many problems. Killing terrorists and the leaders of Hezbollah may deter some people 
from participating and be an effective way to enforce the rule of law, but it does little to 
address the root issues or causes behind terrorism or why Hezbollah exists in the first 
place.  
While many would argue that the threat of death or a targeted killing may deter 
people from participation in a terrorist group such as Hezbollah, a more useful solution 
may be to understand how to provide Hezbollah’s members with opportunity and some 
form of common social background not rooted in extremism. Many experts would 
suggest that targeted killing actually creates more terrorists than it gets rid of. In the 
Israeli example, opponents of targeted killing argue “that it generates worldwide 
condemnation, disrupts diplomatic negotiations, fuels Palestinian anger, and, what may 
be most important, increases the number of terrorists.”68 In Hezbollah’s case, Nasrallah 
has reached global popularity and following. Nasrallah is viewed by many to be "the first 
                                                 
67 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs (Mar/Apr, 2006): 4. 
68 Ibid., 1. 
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leader to really defeat Israel. He does not live in palaces or drive a Mercedes. He lives 
with the fighters and the people…Nasrallah is the only true Arab leader today."69 While 
a targeted killing operation against Nasrallah would eliminate a huge symbol of 
Hezbollah, it may also create a martyr and generate more support and more followers of 
Hezbollah’s extreme ideology.  
Several studies have tried to capture this “martyr effect.” In a mathematical 
analysis of data collected over a three-year period, several authors attempted to correlate 
targeted killings and the recruitment of new terrorists. The study indicated that 
recruitment of future terrorists increased after the killing of a terrorist, but also showed 
that the number and effectiveness of future attacks went down70. According to this study, 
the net effect of targeted killing would tend to create more, but less skilled terrorists. So, 
while it may appear that targeted killing lowers the skill level and expertise of a terrorist 
group; it actually grows the size of the group and with time, the expertise will return. So 
what is it about groups such as Hezbollah that lead people to join them? 
The terrorist groups clearly offer something to individuals that can never be 
solved by a targeted killing. In cases such as Hezbollah, they offer the people a champion 
against a formidable enemy, Israel, which they cannot defeat on their own. Hezbollah 
also offers social services, jobs, welfare and prestige which are not offered by the local 
government and the local population will not simply stop supporting Hezbollah because 
its leader is killed.  
Authors such as Mark Juergensmeyer suggest that terrorist groups effectively 
preach a very powerful message known as Cosmic War, which also inspires people to 
join a group and to follow it to extreme lengths. Juergensmeyer introduces this type of 
message as cosmic because “they are larger than life”71. He notes the relationship to 
                                                 
69 Dan Murphy “In war's dust, a new Arab 'lion' emerges Hizbullah's Nasrallah is hailed as a regional 
hero,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 29, 2006,  http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0829/p01s02-
wome.html (accessed December 11, 2007).     
70 Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, and Shaul Misal, “What happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Issue 28, 2005, 225.  
71 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 
146.  
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metaphysical conflicts between good and evil. Hezbollah often uses the power of Cosmic 
War as it defines the battle with Israel. Nasrallah has stated, "I am against any 
reconciliation with Israel. I do not even recognize the presence of a state that is called 
'Israel.' I consider its presence both unjust and unlawful. That is why if Lebanon 
concludes a peace agreement with Israel and brings that accord to the Parliament our 
deputies will reject it; Hezbollah refuses any conciliation with Israel in principle."72 
Nasrallah uses the idea of cosmic struggle against Israel to prevent any thought of 
compromise and help foster support for violent action. Hezbollah also invokes a feeling 
of divine entitlement behind violence against Israel by linking it to Cosmic War through 
statements such as “the Islamic resistance will hit Tel Aviv and is able to do that with 
God's help."73 Epic images from ancient religious texts show God engaged in battle and 
believers of Cosmic War tie their cause and methods to these grand scenarios of divine 
warfare74. Terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, using this message, preach violence 
justified by divine entitlement, divine inspiration, scriptural precedent and the idea that 
there is no room for compromise because of God’s will. Since there is no room for 
compromise and followers believe in an all out battle between good and evil, a targeted 
killing will have little effect in deterring a group that believes in the Cosmic War mantra. 
As an example, Israel conducted a targeted killing on the previous leader of Hezbollah, 
Abbas al-Musawi, in 1992 and it appeared to have little effect on deterring the 
organizational focus or the future and current leader, Hassan Nasrallah. A more 
appropriate solution may be the refocusing of the theology of the group with the help of 
religious leaders, the state and international system.  
The military is almost counterproductive to solving terrorism and particularly 
counterproductive when using targeted killings. Many terrorist organizations are formed 
to fight an oppressive local government or, as in Hezbollah’s case, a far government that 
is seen as an occupier or exploiter. Globalization has moved U.S. interests to every part 
                                                 
72 Hassan Nasrallah, interview, “Q&A: Said Hassan Nasrallah; What Hezbollah Will Do” Washington 
Post, February 20, 2000, B05. 
73 CNN, “Hezbollah threatens to attack Tel Aviv as payback for airstrikes,” August 3, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/03/mideast.main/index.html (accessed December 11, 2007).  
74 Ibid., 146. 
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of the globe and to protect those interests, its military is there as well. The U.S. and its 
allies are seen as exploiters of the world’s natural resources and cheap labor and make an 
easy target for a group trying to gain legitimacy and membership. Hezbollah has made a 
point to attack foreign occupiers of Lebanon regardless of their intentions and has been 
successful in gaining both legitimacy and increased membership while doing so. Another 
significant issue against targeted killing, is the significant need for actionable 
intelligence. As Philip Heymann points out, there are significant consequences of gaining 
that intelligence. Detention without prosecution, torture and other tactics are often used 
by the U.S. and Israel to gather intelligence75.  These tactics are often viewed as crucial 
to develop actionable intelligence, but the consequence can spawn whole generations of 
new terrorists similar to Ayman al-Zawahiri and other products of Egyptian torture 
techniques. There are many debates on how good this type of intelligence is in the first 
place and inaccurate intelligence for a targeted killing can have seriously negative 
consequences.  
One of the most important elements of a targeted killing is the accuracy of 
intelligence and collateral damage. An erroneous attack can seriously effect world 
opinion, damage a nation’s credibility and prestige and kill innocent people. For example, 
during a targeted attack launched by a CIA-operated aircraft against targets in a northern 
Pakistani village, flawed intelligence created an international incident.  In this case, “U.S. 
officials say intelligence suggested al-Qaeda's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was meeting 
with a group of extremist associates. Pakistani officials say Zawahiri was not in the 
village and eighteen civilians were killed, setting off angry demonstrations across 
Pakistan against the United States.”76 Targeted killing is serious business and the 
decision to strike should only be taken when the intelligence overlaps in multiple ways 
and every effort is made to reduce collateral damage. Even when great efforts are made to 
eliminate or prevent collateral damage, it is still a built-in cost of this technique. During 
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http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_012506.html?_r=1&oref=slogin  (accessed December 11, 
2007).  
 47
the targeting of a senior Hamas leader, Israel went out of their way to attempt to have him 
arrested by both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Defense Forces before deciding 
to kill him. Once the decision to target him for killing was complete, eight missions were 
called off because of collateral damage issues. When Israel finally felt comfortable with 
the collateral damage assessment, they moved to kill him. “When the massive bomb 
demolished the target, it also damaged several of these other buildings. Shehada was 
killed -- but so were at least 14 civilians, including his daughter and eight other 
children.”77 As you can see, even the best intentions and efforts to control collateral 
damage can still lead to disaster when using this technique. If a nation does not have firm 
resolve, amazing real time intelligence, and the ability to withstand international scorn 
and protest, this is not the technique to use.  
4. Recommendations/Conclusion 
Targeted killing is an effective tool to eliminate leadership in terrorist 
organizations, disrupt the planning and timing of future attacks and to deter future 
individuals from leading those organizations. It is however, a blunt instrument that tends 
to kill innocent people in the process and incite outrage from the public if the targeting is 
flawed or sloppy. In light of these issues and consequences, targeted killing has a place as 
part of our national defense strategy. However, targeted killing appears to be only 
marginally effective and certainly insufficient when used by itself against a socially 
embedded terrorist group such as Hezbollah. Any solution against Hezbollah requires 
addressing the root causes of the organization not just killing or capturing its members. 
Otherwise the cycle of terrorism will continue and each targeted leader will be replaced 
by another with no end in sight.  
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C. A LOOK AT INDIRECT STRATEGIES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
AS A SOLUTION 
The United States and Israel have been trying to defeat Hezbollah for over 25 
years, so finding an appropriate strategy is clearly difficult. Based on multiple historic 
examples, a socially embedded terrorist organization such as Hezbollah does not appear 
to be as vulnerable to destruction from conventional military attack as Al-Qaeda would 
be78. Even if its capabilities are destroyed by military means, Hezbollah will simply 
rebuild, retrain and regrow.79  Therefore, a successful solution to the Hezbollah problem 
must be tied to addressing the root causes of terrorism and displacing any perceived 
benefit the group provides to the local population. 
To defeat Hezbollah, a complex strategy of both direct and indirect means is in 
order. The United States should disrupt Hezbollah’s support networks by: targeting state 
sponsors such as Iran and Syria, monitoring international charities, supporting South 
American efforts to disrupt terrorist financing, and cut flows of support from Europe. The 
United States should reduce Hezbollah’s support from the local population by: giving 
intensive financial and material support to the legitimate Lebanese government; using the 
United Nations and other locally excepted organizations to provide social services, job 
training, education and infrastructure support; and effectively displacing every benefit 
that Hezbollah provides to the people. The United States should disrupt Hezbollah’s 
ability to conduct global operations by: exacerbating internal Lebanese sectarian conflict, 
working to establish a global coalition against Hezbollah as a designated terrorist 
organization, using an information campaign to portray Hezbollah as an international 
terror proxy for Iran, and by selectively and covertly killing or capturing Hezbollah’s 
military leaders. 
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The first issue, state sponsorship of Hezbollah, is a very difficult challenge to our 
policy makers. Understanding our adversary and what they want is a key to success. Once 
we understand those desires, altering Iran’s behavior with incentives and sanctions will 
be much easier. A common error made during modern diplomacy is twofold: not 
understanding our enemies and imposing Western ideals and thinking on problems. 
Correspondingly, Iran has two key issues that we may take advantage of: an energy 
problem and an internal political/religious struggle.  By understanding these internal 
Iranian issues, we can derive our solution to altering the behavior of Iran’s leaders.  
Iran’s oil fields are shutting down. Oil exports account for half of Iran’s total 
revenue80. Some experts believe Iran may not have any oil left over for export in as soon 
as ten years. Iran has several choices by which to solve this problem. The Iranian 
government tried to curtail its demand for fuel and began a gasoline rationing program, 
but the program ended in failure81. Since Iran currently imports 40% of their gasoline 
from the European company Vitol, we could pressure the company to halt its dealings 
with Iran or simply buy out the company’s stake in the deal. While this would have 
significant effects on Iran, it would only cost the U.S. about $5 billion dollars a year82. 
Since Iran has failed to curtail its demand for power, it needs new sources. Iran wants to 
use nuclear power as a new source of power and the United States finds the associated 
risks of that solution unacceptable. A simultaneous combination of deterrence, sanctions, 
and incentives should allow the United States to influence their decisions. The sanctions 
must affect all aspects of banking, trade and resourcing related to funding international 
terror. We have a unique ability through the Treasury Department to clear all dollar 
transactions across the world. That is, all banks must go through the U.S. Treasury if they 
are executing a transaction in U.S. dollars. By modernizing our own systems after 9/11, 
we have been able to uncover complex relationships and ownership of financial 
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transactions. While working within the current sanctions imposed by the United Nations, 
the Treasury Department has uncovered several banking ties and transactions by 
European banks with Iran. We recently fined UBS, a Swiss bank, $100 million and 
another Dutch bank over $80 million for conducting business with Iran. As a result of 
those fines and our ability to monitor the transactions, most large European banks have 
stopped conducting business with Iran83.   By uncovering ties to Hezbollah and by 
squeezing our allies to cut their banking ties with Iran, the United States has effectively 
reduced Iran’s ability to modernize most of its infrastructure. While we have been 
sanctioning Iran for over 25 years, the consensus we have built with the UN and Europe 
is finally giving the sanctions teeth. We should continue this approach. These current 
sanctions are putting enormous political pressure on Iran’s leaders to improve the quality 
of life for the population of Iran84.  This gives the United States an opportunity to use a 
combination of both sanctions and incentives. The sanctions should continue to cut off 
foreign aid and development (a critical component to stop the oil field degradation), slow 
banking ties, put significant pressure on all companies that are considering working with 
Iran, and hinder trading partners with diplomatic pressure.  
The incentives would give Iran an option to solve their inherent energy problem 
and save face with the population.  They should include massive foreign investment in 
the oil infrastructure of Iran to help reverse their natural decline rates of their oil fields, 
estimated at 8 to 10 percent a year85. According to experts, “modern methods of 
enhanced oil recovery, which involve reinjecting natural gas to flush out more oil from 
the fields, can greatly increase production rates but are both costly and difficult to 
perform without foreign assistance.”86 This option still has work to do, but has the most 
promise.  
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Another issue to leverage against Iran is their internal political/religious struggle. 
The younger population in Iran is yearning for a Western lifestyle and the benefits of a 
booming economy. However, they are currently denied both because of radical policies 
such as funding terrorist organizations. The United States can use that to its advantage 
and promote turmoil within Iran. The United States should make it clear to the people of 
Iran that the policies of the Ahmedinejad administration are directly to blame for their 
hardships. A savvy combination of information operation, use of the internet, radio and 
television will be required. Since Ahmedinejad is the clear proponent of funding terror 
and inciting conflict with Israel, every effort should be made to discredit him in the 
international community and in the eyes of his people. This should discount his radical 
efforts and enable the United States to influence their decisions away from the funding 
terror. 
One significant issue which affects our leverage against Iran is the price of oil. 
Even Ahmedinejad acknowledges how much power this has over his country’s affairs 
stating “It is a signal to Iran’s enemies saying we are ready and we will manage the 
country even if you lower the oil prices more. We assume our enemies want to damage us 
by decreasing the price of oil. So we must reduce our dependency on oil revenue.”87 The 
current challenge for our policy makers is that Hezbollah’s current support allocation is 
based on an Iranian budget that uses $33.70 per barrel of oil as the revenue planning 
figure88, as of May 25, 2008 the price was $132.64.89 A coherent United States energy 
policy should significantly reduce the price of oil and put more pressure on Iran at the 
same time.  
Outside of Iranian state sponsorship we must use a broad approach to cut off 
Hezbollah’s other support networks. We should develop an international alliance that 
bans Hezbollah’s military wing altogether. If Hezbollah can be shown as a direct threat to 
the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Lebanese government, we will be able to build a 
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coalition against Hezbollah. The perceived and partially real legitimacy of Hezbollah is 
one of the key reasons individuals and charities are so successful in raising funds for the 
organization. If we are successful in building a cohesive government that has a real 
presence in southern Lebanon, then there is no need for Hezbollah to exist and the 
security problem for Israel is reduced at the same time. While this is clearly a significant 
undertaking, the direct approach has had little success and it is time to change. To defeat 
Hezbollah’s crime networks, we must continue to assist foreign nations in Africa and 
South America in training and funding their law enforcement and judicial systems. At a 
minimum, we must develop close enough relations to monitor the activity and trace it to 
its destination to assist in understanding the networks. We must also continue to forge 
interagency relationships and information sharing within the United States to ensure that 
bureaucratic issues do not interfere with our ability to track and disrupt networks 
operating within our own borders.  Ultimately we must defeat the perceived legitimacy of 
Hezbollah if we are ever going to defeat the organization as a whole. However, by 
understanding the network and how it finances its activities we will be able to 
significantly disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to continue its worldwide network of terror. 
Once we have made progress disrupting Hezbollah’s outside support network, we 
must attack its support from within the local population of Lebanon. Alex Grynkewich 
highlights the power of an organization when it fulfills the social contract with citizens 
and the local government does not.90 The United States should develop a coalition which 
provides intensive financial and material support to the legitimate Lebanese government 
so that it can displace the social services provided by Hezbollah. Once the legitimate 
Lebanese government is able to provide job training, education and infrastructure 
support, the side effects of Hezbollah’s terrorist activities will no longer be tolerated by 
the local population.   
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The final, and arguably most important issue left to deal with is disrupting 
Hezbollah’s ability to conduct global terrorist operations. Many would argue that the 
international portion of Hezbollah’s operations is conducted on behalf of Iranian orders.91  
To thwart this ability, the United States should use an information campaign to 
portray Hezbollah as an international proxy of Iran. We should make all the ties, evidence 
and links available to all of our allies and work hard to build a coalition against the proxy 
war practice by making Iran directly responsible for all terrorist acts committed by 
Hezbollah. We used this technique against Libya starting in the 1980s and while it was 
slow, it did work.  To tie up Hezbollah’s resources and energy within Lebanon, we could 
attempt to exacerbate the internal Lebanese sectarian conflict and highlight the violence 
and damage caused by Hezbollah.  And finally, we should selectively and covertly kill or 
capture Hezbollah’s military leaders. This military-only focus would continue to put 
pressure on Hezbollah’s military wing and as long as military commanders are the only 
ones targeted we can reduce most of the draw backs associated with direct military action 
against this type of socially embedded terrorist group.  
Stopping Hezbollah is clearly going to be a very difficult task. Many different 
nations have been fighting the organization since its inception and Hezbollah continues to 
thrive. However, it is possible to defeat any organization given the correct strategy and 
the points raised in this paper should at least be a starting point toward the ultimate goal 
of defeating Hezbollah.  
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